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BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARD OF PROOF, AND EVIDENCE 
ISSUES UNDER THE CISG 
Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi* 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Rules of evidence are fundamental to determining a party’s rights in 
dispute resolution. One the one hand, they determine what evidence is needed 
to show whether a party has rights and the circumstances under which those 
rights might be granted. On the other hand, the rules help predict the strength 
of the evidence in the eyes of the decision-maker. Moreover, the many 
problems regarding whether the rules of evidence are to be qualified either 
as procedural or substantive law are precisely related to this role of the means 
of evidence. 
The Italian model helps demonstrate these issues. The decision of the 
Italian legislature of 1942 to include the evidence provisions in the Civil 
Code, is both consequential and coherent, developing under different (but 
complementary) profiles. In that context, in fact, the evidence assumes 
importance, in general, as a “means” or “tool” granted to anyone to assert or, 
depending on the case, to defend their rights outside of the courtroom and 
prior to the judgment. 
In fact, the “evidence” and the “virtual security” of obtaining rights’ 
recognition, by virtue of the evidence eventually available, constitute a 
“condition already normally sufficient in itself” to impose the respect of such 
rights, even regardless of their possible judicial protection, ensuring the 
“calm enjoyment,” as well as the full “security” of the negotiations 
concerning them. At the base there is a substantive conception qualifying the 
evidence as a condition of the prior defense of the “security of private 
negotiations, or as means of protection of the rights, also outside and before 
the judgement.”1 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Professor of Law at Alma Mater Studiorum—University of Bologna. 
1 LUIGI PAOLO COMOGLIO, LE PROVE CIVILI 30 (3d ed. 2010). 
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It follows, that the rules of evidence—which tend to regulate, as far as 
possible, their “preconstitution” ante judicium, as well as the conditions of 
their admissibility and “legal” effectiveness—find their logical place in the 
system of the Italian Civil Code (C.c.), even before that of the rules regarding 
proper judicial protection. The Code of Civil Procedure (C.p.c) and the rules 
of procedure, on the other hand, are subject to the technical discipline of the 
methods and forms by which the evidence can be acquired or adduced in the 
course of a judgment.2 
The evident practical effects of the above-mentioned approach are to be 
found in the consolidated principle, typical of the Italian legal system, 
according to which the rules on the burden of proof and on the admissibility 
and relevance of evidence belong to the substantive law, and therefore are 
considered to be “two-faced,” as evidenced in the Ministerial Report to the 
Code. 
In reality, it must be borne in mind that the distinction between 
substantive law and procedural law is based on clear premises of historical 
and political relativity. The classification of certain groups of rules, 
sometimes regarded as substantive or alternatively as procedural, is likely to 
vary over time because of factors which do not relate to their specific nature, 
but which take into account the practical consequences of their application in 
certain areas of experience or the different judicial policy objectives. In 
reality, it is necessary to underline the fundamental teleological element, 
which unites the rules of evidence in a single qualification of instrumental 
nature, linking both the distribution of the burden of proof and the 
configuration and discipline of the various tests, to the primary forecast of 
their natural effectiveness in the process and for the process. 
However, the tendency of a reform in Italy is today in favor of the 
inclusion of the entire discipline of evidence in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
giving it a uniform procedural qualification.3 
The proposed framework does not respond to simple classification or 
systematic needs, but it is in line with the tendency of the public sector to 
prevail over the private one in the regulation of procedural activities, 
                                                                                                                           
 
2 MICHELE TARUFFO, LA PROVA NEL PROCESSO CIVILE, IN TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE E 
COMMERCIALE 31 (2012). 
3 COMOGLIO, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
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facilitating the creation of a renewed balance of power between the initiative 
of the parties and the ex officio powers of the judge.4 
This, moreover, is not just an Italian problem but rather one which is 
widely debated, and the question of whether evidence should be governed by 
the lex fori or the lex causae becomes extremely relevant for the resolution 
of conflicts of law issues in international disputes. 
II. CLASSIFICATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS OF UNIFORM LAW 
The problem cannot be underestimated in any way, because if the 
instruments of uniform law have given excellent results, starting for example 
with the CISG, there is the risk that the efforts for the harmonisation of 
international sales law can be compromised by the inevitable differences still 
present in the various countries in relation to matters of procedural law. 
The law of evidence in the CISG has been affected, for a long time, by 
the unresolved issue of whether evidence is to be subjected to substantive 
law or solely to procedural law. In this sense, the law of evidence has been 
the topic of endless, and for the most part unresolved, debates concerning its 
substantive or procedural nature. 
The question of whether evidence should be governed by the lex fori or 
the lex causae becomes relevant for the resolution of conflicts of law issues 
in international disputes since, in most countries, the rules of evidence are 
classified as substantive, not as procedural rules. 
From a practical point of view, it is sometimes very hard for courts to 
interpret the content of foreign laws, also considering that the nature of such 
rules is still the topic of animated debates among the legal scholars in the 
specific domestic systems. 
If the solution to this issue was uniform, the issue itself would be 
obviously solved: indeed, if the rules of evidence were to be considered rules 
of substantive law, they would automatically be interpreted in the light of the 
Convention to the extent that they were subject to the Convention; on the 
contrary, if the rules of evidence were to be considered rules of procedural 
law, then the lex fori would be the law to be looked at. 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 ERNESTO FABIANI, I POTERI ISTRUTTORI DEL GIUDICE CIVILE 37 (Edizioni scientifiche italiane 
2008). 
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There is no doubt that the second option would be the most dangerous 
one. Indeed, the fear, among legal practitioners, that the “well-recognized 
goal of promoting uniformity in international trade and the great efforts made 
to achieve an independent set of substantive rules would be nullified by the 
application of arcane or outdated domestic procedural rules,” is certainly 
justified.5 
Anticipating the conclusions discussed later in this Article, it is 
important to highlight, from this very moment on, the fact that any issue 
concerning evidence in relation to the Convention—would not be solved 
even with a clear answer to the question above, because such issues would 
need to be addressed on a case by case basis, starting from common 
principles. 
We are, indeed, all aware that it is impossible to list of every potential 
conflict that may arise between the substantive law governing the contract 
and the procedural rules applicable to the dispute. Hence, for the purpose of 
our discussion, we can only say that there is a need to resolve these conflicts 
in accordance with the Convention’s well-documented goal of uniformity.6 
“It is one thing to say that domestic procedural law should govern the 
conflict at all times; it is quite another to seek a solution in accordance with 
the general principles of the CISG.”7 Resorting “to the domestic procedural 
law must be the exception, not the rule.”8 “In such cases, the risk of making 
statements devoid of practical meaning, based exclusively on theoretical 
reasoning,” is very concrete.9 
Therefore, instead of wondering whether an issue has to be categorized 
as either procedural or substantive, we simply have to decide if the subject is 
regulated by the CISG.10 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi, Procedural Law Issues and Uniform Law Conventions, 5 UNIF. L. 
REV. 23, 26 (2000). 
6 Ulrich Magnus, Opting In and Opting Out: Can There be Uniform Interpretation or Does Variatio 
Delectat Govern?, 38 U. PITT. J.L. & COM. 360 (2019–2020). 
7 Orlandi, supra note 5, at 29. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Milena Djordjevic, Article 4, in UN-CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) 31 (Stefan M. Kröll, Lucas A. Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2018); Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, Article 4, in COMMENTARY 5 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2016). 
 
2019-2020] EVIDENCE ISSUES UNDER THE CISG 127 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.198 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
III. BURDEN OF PROOF 
Deciding whether an issue is covered by the CISG is important in 
relation to the burden of proof and its allocation. 
It has long been discussed whether the burden of proof has to be 
considered an issue going beyond the CISG’s scope of application and 
consequently governed by the non-harmonized national law.11 
As of today, however, the opinion according to which the burden of 
proof is a matter governed by the CISG in the sense of Article 7(2), seems to 
prevail among scholars, and is widely recognized in a majority of court 
decisions as well as arbitral awards.12 
It has been highlighted, however, how the CISG is not an exhaustive 
body of rules. In this regard, a distinction needs to be made between the 
“external gaps,” or “lacunae praeter legem,” and the “internal gaps,” or 
“lacunae intra legem,” and the way these gaps are dealt with.13 The first ones 
are issues excluded from the CISG’s sphere of application and, since they are 
not covered by the Convention, they need to be addressed by resorting to the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum. 
On the contrary, the latter ones are issues governed by the CISG but not 
expressly included in it. In this case, the issues are to be settled in conformity 
with the general principles on which the Convention is based, as per Article 
7(2), and only where this cannot be achieved, recourse to the law applicable 
by virtue of the lex fori may be had. 
The principle of “onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non qui negat” 
has been recognized by the majority of countries. For instance, it is regulated 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 See Stefan M. Kröll, The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods under Art. 35 CISG, 
3 BELGRADE L. REV. 162, 168 (2011); Harry Flechtner, Addressing Parol Evidence Issues in Contracts 
Governed by the CISG, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS UNDER THE CISG 330 (Harry Flechtner, Ronald Brand 
& Mark Walter eds., 2007). 
12 Schwenzer, supra note 10, at 85–86. 
13 For the use of this expression, see, e.g., Jürgen Basedow, Uniform Law Conventions and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 129, 135 (2000); ALDO 
FRIGNANI & MARCO TORSELLO, IL CONTRATTO INTERNAZIONALE 444 (Cedam: Milan 2d ed. 2010); 
Franco Ferrari, The CISG’s Interpretative Goals, Its Interpretative Method and Its General Principles in 
Case Law, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT, Aug. 4, 2013, at 188; Djordjevic, supra note 10, at 46. 
See also FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW—CISG IN A NUTSHELL 
(West Academic Publishing 2d ed. 2018) (making interesting remarks about how to fill internal and 
external gaps). 
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in Italy by Article 2697 of the Civil Code, which assigns the burden to one 
party instead of the other, based on the distinction between facts giving rise 
or modifying a right or obligations and facts that extinguish or prevent a right 
or obligation. Therefore, the party which invokes its right to assert a claim is 
required to prove the facts supporting the claim, while the objections or 
defenses to such claim are to be proven by the party raising them. This 
principle establishes, in general, that each party has to prove the existence of 
the factual prerequisites contained in the legal provision upon which such 
party wants to rely on for its claims or defenses.14 
This does not depend only on the fact that this principle is considered a 
matter of substantive law (as it is often considered), but because there are 
direct and indirect clues within the CISG, entailing its inclusion in the CISG’s 
basic principles. 
As a consequence, even though the CISG does not contain an express 
rule on the allocation of the burden of proof, a rule on the burden of proof is 
expressly included in Article 79 of the CISG and this has been considered 
enough to rebut the argument that the CISG does not cover the issue at hand. 
Article 79(1) of the CISG states that the non-performing party must 
prove the circumstances exempting it from liability for its failure to perform, 
thereby implicitly confirming that it is up to the other party to prove the fact 
of the failure to perform as such.15 Therefore, it is up to the buyer proving the 
existence of a lack of conformity and the damage arising from it. 
Moreover, along with this express mention, there are several other rules 
in which, at least implicitly, actual references to the distribution of the burden 
of proof are made, both as to the general principle mentioned above or as to 
more specific rules in which there is a shift of the burden between the parties. 
I am referring in particular, but without the pretense of being exhaustive, to 
Articles 35, 74 (see also, e.g. Articles 2, 25, 36, 39 . . . etc.). 
It is important to keep in mind that the rule on the burden of proof is 
also essential to allow a judge to decide the case. It is indeed defined as a rule 
of judgment enabling the judge to issue, in any case, a decision, against the 
party that did not fulfill the burden of proof prescribed by law (the so-called 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 See Stefan M. Kröll, Article 35, in UN-CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) 528 (Stefan M. Kröll, Lucas A. Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2018). 
15 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, art. 7(2) Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
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“burden of persuasion” or “the risk of non-persuasion”). “In subjective terms, 
the party having the burden of proof bears the burden of factual 
substantiation: burden of proof in its objective sense means the risk of a party 
bearing the burden of facts not being sufficiently established.”16 
This is particularly true and essential in the countries where gathering 
the evidence is on the parties and not on the judge (the burden of adducing 
evidence). Indeed, the content of the notion is also influenced by the nature 
of the system in which it is used, whether it is an adversarial system or 
whether it is an inquisitorial one. 
The definition of burden of proof is only apparently simple and clear. In 
reality, as the practical operators are well aware, it entails countless 
complications in its application. It is to be understood as a reference to the 
substantive facts underlying the claims and presented by the parties, and most 
of the time, as a connection to the procedural position held by each party (but 
this is not always true, and that is why it would be wrong to use the expression 
“onus probandi incumbit actori”). 
Sometimes the legislator intervenes directly on the allocation of the 
burden of proof through presumptions. However, in general, it is misleading 
to think that the substantive rule always confers a certain binding effect to 
the allocation of the risk of proof. There are many other elements that can 
influence such allocation, and, in any case, the situations considered by the 
legislator are always simplifications of real cases. 
The determination of the burden of proof thus ends up being carried out 
by the judge based on criteria completing and qualifying the legal case by 
adaptation to the specific case, such as, for example, the appearance, interest, 
normality, and the negative nature of the fact to be proven. 
As to this point, it would also be important to verify how to regulate the 
thema probandum. For instance, in many legal systems, the facts not 
contested no longer need to be proven. 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Kröll, supra note 11, at 167 (citing Appellationshof Bern (Appellate Court, Bern Switzerland) 
11 Feb. 2004 (wire and cable), IHR (2006), 149 (150), CISG-Online 1191 at para. 3 (Pace)). 
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IV. THE PROOF OF PROXIMITY 
At this point, the proof of proximity criteria enters into play.17 This 
principle, that has lately received increased attention in scholarly writings 
and case law, aims to mitigate the potential negative consequences of an 
abstract allocation of the burden of proof. Considerations of equity based on 
the notion that each party has to prove the facts originating from its sphere 
support or somehow modify the general rule.18 
For example, proof by the debtor that he has performed his obligation(s) 
is sometimes easier than proving the negative fact of the non-performance by 
the creditor. The need to simplify the defense’s exercise of rights requires, 
therefore, that the party close to the evidence bears the burden of producing 
the elements necessary for the decision in court, and therefore the party which 
bears the risk of lack of proof. 
It does not seem necessary to question whether the basis for this proof 
of proximity principle is present within the CISG, because, even if it is 
considered a principle of national law, the results do not change. It is clear 
that these considerations are usually applied by the courts of civil law 
jurisdictions, where the principle is stated in their national law and there is a 
lack of wide reaching discovery opportunities (on the contrary, this principle 
of proof proximity is not widely considered in common law jurisdictions, 
such as the U.S. one, where the parties have wider discovery rights, allowing 
them to get hold of evidence from the sphere of the other party).19 
In Italy, for instance, the proof of proximity principle went from being 
occasionally cited to being a fundamental principle of the system, following 
a decision by the Joint Chambers of the Supreme Court on a domestic sale 
contract issue.20 
Starting with the facts, the Supreme Court stated that it is easier for the 
debtor to prove the performance of its obligations than for the creditor to 
prove the negative fact of the non-performance, according to the rule 
“negativa non sunt probanda.” 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 See Schwenzer, supra note 10, at 86; Chiara Besso, La vicinanza della prova, in PROBLEMI 
RELATIVI ALLA PROVA NEL PROCESSO CIVILE 45 (Bononia Univ. Press 2016). 
18 Kröll, supra note 11, at 171. 
19 Id. 
20 Besso, supra note 17. 
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The trend of weakening the burden of proof principle seems to be the 
result of how the proceedings can be seen under a different light.21 The 
positive attitude towards the proof of proximity principle, indeed, highlights 
the fact that, in the Italian system, a new regime of proof is arising, based on 
the principle of collaboration between the parties and the judge, already 
existing in other civil law systems such as France and Brazil. 
V. THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
Another issue related to the burden of proof is the standard of proof. 
Different opinions exist even on this issue. Numerous commentators and 
courts consider the standard of proof an issue of procedural law and, 
therefore, to be regulated by the lex fori, even if they believe that the burden 
of proof issue falls within the scope of application of the Convention. 
Only recently, the trend has started to change. Indeed, many notable 
scholars consider the standard of proof to be inferred from the Convention. 
Using the term “inferring” raises the question of whether the issue is to be 
considered regulated by the Convention or whether it is, instead, extracted 
by its general principles as per Article 7(2).22 
However, in reality, as far as the standard of proof is concerned, I 
believe it is useless to determine if it is a matter of substantive or procedural 
law. We need to find, instead, the solution that best fits the scope of the 
Convention. 
From this point of view, it seems clear that allowing the standard of 
proof to be evaluated in light with domestic law would put in danger the 
uniform interpretation and applicability of the very same Convention. 
The question of which one is the actual standard to be sought is easy to 
answer. It is logical to identify it within the Convention itself. The prevalent 
opinion holds that the reasonableness criteria should be the reference point 
to start from. Not only the terms “reasonable” and “reasonableness” are often 
used in the Conventions, but case law, for instance in Italy, is based on the 
concept of the “preponderance of the evidence” which seems to resemble the 
reasonableness criteria. 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Id. 
22 CISG, art. 7(2). 
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Also, in the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure, Article 21.2 states that, “[f]acts are considered proven when the 
court is reasonably convinced of their truth.”23 “The standard of ‘reasonably 
convinced’ is in substance that applied in most legal systems. The standard 
in the United States and some other countries is ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ but functionally that is essentially the same.”24 
VI. FREEDOM OF EVIDENCE 
Lastly, a brief analysis of the questions of evidence within the Vienna 
Convention in relation to the informality set forth in its Article 11 is needed. 
Article 11 states that “A contract of sale need not be concluded in or 
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. 
It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.”25 
It is worth mentioning that not all of the delegations agreed to take this 
principle from the Hague Convention and insert it into the Vienna 
Convention.26 In the end, this approach was accepted with a compromise and 
the inclusion of Articles 12 and 96 in the text of the convention was agreed 
upon. 
Article 11, with its freedom of proof and its freedom of form, may in 
fact be excluded where one of the Contracting States, within which one of 
the parties has its place of business, has signed the reservation contained in 
Article 96. Therefore, the non-applicability of Article 11 derives from the 
provisions of Article 12, the only provision of the Convention, which does 
not allow exceptions.27 This Article expressly provides for the non-
applicability, in the presence of a declaration of reservation pursuant to 
Article 96, of the provisions allowing for the manner in which consent is 
given for the conclusion, modification or termination of sales contracts, to be 
in a form other than writing. 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Unidroit, ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, 4 UNIF. L. REV. 758, 796 
(2004). 
24 Id. 
25 CISG, art. 11. 
26 See Schmidt-Kessel, Article 11, in COMMENTARY 210 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg 
Schwenzer eds., 2016). 
27 Luigi Paolo Comoglio, Libertà di forma e libertà di prova nella compravendita internazionale 
di merci, RIV. TRIM. DIR. E PROC. CIV. 793 (1990). 
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Except for this limited case, Article 11 sets forth, clearly, two 
fundamental rules: it establishes, on one side, a substantive rule according to 
which no form requirement is needed for a sale contract to be valid, and, on 
the other side, a procedural rule according to which no form requirement is 
needed to prove the contract itself. It further specifies that the contract can 
be proven with any means of evidence, even with testimony. The 
fundamental principle of informality (or form freedom) translates into the 
other fundamental principle of freedom of evidence. 
The same principle is expressly included in the third paragraph of 
Article 8 of the CISG, relating to the contract.28 Having said that, the analysis 
of this principle would require much more attention than I can devote to on 
this occasion, hence, at this time, I will simply try to present a few general 
considerations to be used on a case by case basis. 
In one of my previous writings, I commented on the 1998 decision 
MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 
F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998); where, for the first time, the Federal Court 
of Appeals succeeded in overriding a well-established domestic principle of 
law: the parol evidence rule.29 Even though we all know this case, as it still 
is the leading case on this issue, I would like to briefly refer to the Court’s 
reasoning. 
In its reasoning, the Court did not confine itself to the mere exclusion of 
the application of the parol evidence rule, but it went further by creating an 
important precedent as to the future enforcement of the parol evidence rule.30 
Contrary to its name, this rule was considered by the Court as a substantive 
rule of law, since it did not purport to exclude a particular type of evidence 
as an untrustworthy or undesirable way of proving a fact, but it prevented 
litigants from demonstrating that fact.31 As such, it was the Court’s belief that 
the rule should not have been automatically applied by federal courts as any 
other procedural matter. 
Consequently, under the Convention, and especially in the light of its 
Articles 8 and 11, the parties’ intent, regardless of the form of their 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 Alberto Zuppi, Article 8, in UN-CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 
152 (Stefan M. Kröll, Lucas A. Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2018). 
29 Orlandi, supra note 5, at 34–35. 
30 Zuppi, supra note 28. 
31 Id. 
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statements, must prevail, if unambiguous, even against written documents. 
“In international trade usage, merchants who have developed the habit of 
concluding their contracts orally and following them up with written 
confirmation often prefer this principle of informality.”32 
I believe that it would be interesting to update the opinion I therein 
expressed relating to the possible consequences on the uniform application 
of the CISG, taking into consideration also arbitral awards, but all I can add 
is that the Italian approach, has not really changed. It is worth mentioning the 
applicability even to judicial proceedings (Article 25 bis C.p.c.) of using 
written testimony similar to the common law affidavits, already available in 
arbitral proceedings (Article 819 ter C.p.c.). 
In conclusion, as I mentioned, the goal of uniform application of the 
Convention can only be achieved through the widest possible admission of 
probative methods, at least in regard to the conclusion of the contract. In my 
view, the only serious limitations to the free admissibility of evidence can 
derive from domestic public policy aimed at safeguarding well-established 
fundamental principles of law. I consider that this should be the rule for every 
kind of process, since the free evaluation of the judge as a tool of final control 
should be sufficient (with the addition of a wide motivation). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of evidence in the Convention is, without a doubt, interesting 
not only for those who study the procedural aspects of a case, but also for 
whomever needs to verify his or her own rights within a judicial proceeding. 
A good level of uniformity in substantive law is, unfortunately, still 
colliding with a series of potential differences that, at the judicial level, show 
their most problematic aspects. The tendency to ignore the theoretical 
classification of rules as substantive or procedural, simply referring to what 
is within the Convention or not, has helped, too, in the resolution of various 
issues, starting with the one on the burden of proof. However, this tendency 
is not enough to guarantee a completely uniform applicability. 
Personally, I still believe that the ideal situation would be to reach, if 
not uniformity, a harmonization of the rules on evidence to be utilized in 
international cases. 
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Unfortunately, as of today, projects to establish a set of procedures that 
transcends national jurisdictional rules and facilitates the resolution of 
disputes arising from transnational commercial transactions do not catch a 
lot of attention. Consider, for instance, the Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure prepared by a joint American Law Institute/UNIDROIT Study 
Group and adopted in 2004 by the Governing Council of UNIDROIT. This 
looked towards the reconciliation of differences among various national rules 
of civil procedure, by taking into account the peculiarities of transnational 
disputes as compared to purely domestic ones (today shared with the ELI 
(l’European Law Institute); but also to the Draft of Uniform European Code 
of Civil Procedure, presented by Storme Commission many years ago 
(1994)).33 
It is true that they might be considered overly ambitious projects and it 
might be better to settle for uniform solutions concerning discovery and the 
rules of evidence. Indeed, in this limited area of law, the need has always 
been considered essential and it has reached positive results, results that are 
a better fit for the resolution of disputes relating to international transactions 
outside judicial proceedings. I am, obviously, referring to arbitration where 
party autonomy led to the search of the best solutions, thanks to a uniform 
collaborative effort. The big impact that the rules of evidence might have in 
an international proceeding make clear the need to allow and to prefer the 
coexistence of customary law principles set forth in different jurisdictions. 
In light of this, two aspects have gained particular attention: on one side, 
the need for predictability, and, on the other side, the strict respect of 
fundamental due process principles. To achieve this, the best arbitration 
practices have started looking, in depth, to the conflict and the possible 
compatibility between principles and rules set forth by different jurisdictions. 
In addition, it went further by materializing this approach into means of soft 
law. Consider, for instance, the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral 
Proceedings (1996)34 or the IBA rules on the Taking of Evidence (2010).35 
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It is not a coincidence that substantive law issues originating from 
uniform law, as the Convention, have been more and more presented to 
arbitrators to the point of increasing the number of awards, in such matters, 
that have been regularly cited next to judicial case law.36 
It is obvious that in a civil proceeding party autonomy is paramount and 
that the influence of the State on its own rules is not present in arbitration. 
However, as we have seen before, the power of the party to achieve (directly 
or indirectly) changes to the rules of evidence that were once impossible to 
even imagine, is constantly growing due to the increased necessity of a 
collaboration between the parties and the judge. 
The goal is to reach the best solution to safeguard citizens and to 
safeguard international business and the related transactions. However, it has 
to be kept in mind that there are rules that cannot be changed in the judicial 
proceedings, proceedings that are of a public nature. The same rigidity does 
not exist in arbitration proceedings that are, by nature, left to the party 
autonomy. Hence, for instance, the parties in an arbitral proceeding can, 
freely and by mutual agreement, refer to the IBA rules. This is not possible 
in a judicial proceeding. 
In conclusion, we have to remember that a judge’s freedom needs to be 
limited by the due process principle, which requires him to clarify to the 
parties which facts need to be proven, which party needs to prove such fact, 
and what the means are to prove such facts (or, if that is the case, which 
means of evidence are not permitted), until the moment in which the parties 
cannot change or integrate their defenses any longer, in order to avoid 
unforeseen outcomes for the parties as a result of the unexpected evaluation 
of the evidence by the judge. 
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